Bayes to the rescue: does the type of hypnotic induction matter? by Martin, Jean-Rémy & Dienes, Zoltan
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bayes to the rescue: Does the type of hypnotic induction matter? 
 
Running head: Bayes and Hypnotic inductions 
 
Jean-Rémy Martin 
University of Sussex 
Zoltan Dienes 
University of Sussex 
Sackler Center for Consciousness Studies 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Authors: 
 
 
Martin Jean-Rémy & Zoltan Dienes 
 
 
School of Psychology 
Pevensey 
Building 
University of 
Sussex Falmer 
BN1 9QH 
 
jm643@sussex.ac.uk 
 
 
dienes@sussex.ac.uk 
2  
Abstract 
 
Studies comparing different forms of hypnotic induction (e.g., indirect versus direct 
induction) on responsiveness to suggestion have typically found no significant 
difference between induction types. However, no firm conclusion can be drawn from a 
non-significant result. In contrast, Bayes factors (Jeffreys, 1939) indicate whether 
evidence favors the null hypothesis (H0) and against the alternative hypothesis (H1), or 
whether data are simply insensitive. Here we apply Bayes factors to those non- 
significant results in order to decide: does the form of hypnotic induction really not 
matter, does it matter, or should we suspend judgment? As the claim that different 
inductions are differentially effective comes mostly from clinicians, we based the Bayes 
factors on hypnotherapists’ judgments of expected differences between inductions. In 
addition, we also used empirical differences between induction versus no-induction as 
an estimate of the order of size of effect that could be expected between different 
inductions, independent of clinical judgment. As a whole, the Bayesian re-analysis of the 
present evidence supports the claim that additional research should be done on the 
influence of the induction procedure on hypnotic responsiveness (at least with regard to 
the inductions considered in the present study), with several exceptions. 
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Introduction 
 
In clinical practice, it is often assumed that the depth of the hypnotic state may vary 
according to the type of hypnotic induction in use (Bandler & Grinder 1975; Erickson & 
Rossi, 1979; see Terhune and Cardena’s 2016 recommendation to optimize inductions; for a 
skeptical review see Weitzenhoffer, 2000, Chapter 4). The hypnotic proceedings typically 
include an induction that presents or defines the context as hypnosis and sets the stage for 
imaginative suggestions that follow (e.g., a hand levitation suggestions to imagine the hand 
rising off the resting surface), which call for changes in behaviors as well as an array of 
subjective experiences including alterations in sensations, perceptions, memories, and the 
experience of involuntariness or nonvolition that often accompanies hypnotic suggestions. 
A strong version of state theories of hypnosis argues that hypnosis instantiates a  
state of consciousness that differs radically from nonhypnotic states of consciousness and 
that the putative altered state associated with hypnosis directly facilitates responses to hypnotic 
suggestions (i.e., suggestions for changes in behavior, experiences of volition and reality; 
Bower, 1966; Fromm, 1992; Jamieson, 2016; Nash, 199; Orne, 1959; Tart, 1983; Woody 
& Bowers, 1994; for a review of types of altered state theories, see Kirsch, 2011). 
Consequently, according to strong versions of altered state theories, the effectiveness of 
different types of hypnotic inductions should be reflected in subjects’ responsiveness to 
suggestions. In contrast, non-state theorists (e.g., T. Barber, 1969; Kirsch, 1985; Lynn et 
al., 2015; Sarbin, 1950; Spanos, 1986) argue that hypnosis does not produce a specific state 
of consciousness that, in itself, facilitates response to hypnotic suggestions. Therefore, the 
type of induction procedure may affect suggestibility indirectly via mundane mechanisms 
of changes in beliefs, expectations, or motivations to respond to hypnotic suggestions (e.g., 
Wickless & Kirsch, 1989, JPSP; Benham et al., 1998, JPSP). For current purposes, we can 
group together with the non-state position those state theories that acknowledge that 
hypnosis produces alterations in consciousness in keeping with suggestions and perhaps 
even a more general altered state of consciousness, but do not regard such a state in a causal 
sense as facilitating other hypnotic responses (cf Kirsch, 2011). 
 
In standard scales of hypnotizability (e.g., Shor & Orne, 1963; Weitzenhoffer & 
Hilgard, 1962) the induction procedure commonly involves suggestions for relaxation 
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(e.g., “You are becoming more and more deeply and comfortably relaxed”) and the 
wording is phrased in a direct style (e.g., “You feel pleasantly, deeply relaxed and very 
comfortable as you continue to hear my voice”). We will refer to this type of induction as 
the standard induction. Studies comparing the effectiveness of different forms of 
induction have usually contrasted the standard induction with other forms of induction 
that diverge in important ways from the standard induction. 
For example, research has contrasted the standard induction with an active-alert 
form of induction in which every suggestion for relaxation in the original induction is 
replaced by suggestions for alertness (e.g., the suggestion “you become more and more 
relax” becomes “you become more and more alert”). In addition, in the active-alert 
induction the participant rides a stationary bicycle during the induction phase, although 
the wording of the induction is still worded in a direct style (Bányai & Hilgard, 1976; 
Malott, 1984; Miller, Barabasz, & Barabasz, 1991). The comparison of the active alert 
with the traditional induction allows testing claims of the relevance of relaxation, 
drowsiness, or eye closure, for instance, to hypnotic responsiveness (Bányai & Hilgard, 
1976). 
Researchers have also contrasted the standard induction with a double induction 
procedure (Matthews, Kirsch, & Mosher, 1985) developed by Bandler and Grinder 
(1975). Matthews et al. (1985), for example, used the double induction procedure as 
follows: The subject was delivered a syntactically complex hand-levitation induction 
into the ear contralateral to the dominant hemisphere and simple (childlike) messages 
for relaxation into the ear contralateral to the non-dominant hemisphere. According to 
Bandler and Grinder (1975), the complex induction is meant to overload the dominant 
hemisphere, which is putatively responsible for normal conscious thinking. In this 
theoretical context, as the dominant hemisphere is overloaded, the non-dominant 
hemisphere, which is the putative neural basis of unconscious processes, can process the 
childlike messages more easily, arguably closer to its own language. 
Lynn, Neufeld, and Matyi (1987) contrasted the standard induction with an 
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indirect form of the induction. In contrast to the former, indirect inductions are worded 
in an indirect and permissive way (for example “Isn’t it nice to close your eyes at the 
end of a day? … maybe your eye lids will feel heavy, or maybe they won’t ..”). Studies 
have yielded conflicting results with respect to the superiority of indirect induction (or 
suggestions) compared with the standard induction (J. Barber, 1977; Van Gorp, Meyer 
& Dunbar, 1985). Lynn et al., (1987) were the first to manipulate the wording (i.e., 
indirect versus direct) of inductions and suggestions independently to make possible a 
direct comparison of the effect of standard versus indirect induction on hypnotizability 
scores. Finally, Van Der Does, Van Dyck, Spinhoven, & Kloosman (1989) contrasted 
the standard induction with an individualized or idiosyncratic procedure. In this case, 
the hypnotist is free to use any procedure (relaxation or not) and wording (direct, indirect 
and so on) that seems appropriate for a particular individual. 
The outcomes of studies evaluating the effectiveness of different forms of 
induction procedures have largely been non-significant. In other words, the active-alert, 
double, indirect, and idiosyncratic inductions did not produce significant differences on 
hypnotizability scores when compared with the standard induction. A tempting 
conclusion from these studies is that the specific form of induction exerts no effect on 
hypnotic responsiveness; what really matters may simply be that subjects understand the 
situation as one in which they should use their hypnotic skills (e.g. Gibbons & Lynn, 
2010; contrast, Malott, 1984). 
Nonetheless, we cannot draw any conclusions about the status of theories from 
a non- significant result in itself. A non-significant result may mean that there is some 
evidence for the null-hypothesis (H0) and against the alternative hypothesis (H1); or it 
may mean that data are simply insensitive in discriminating H0 from H1(Dienes, 2014). 
The latter case may arise even when the evidence favors the alternative hypothesis 
somewhat more than the null hypothesis. Therefore, no substantive conclusion follows 
from a non-significant result. By contrast, Bayes factors can indicate whether data 
provide relative evidence for the null (H0), for the alternative (H1), or whether data are 
simply  insensitive  in  distinguishing  the  hypotheses  (e.g.  Jeffreys,  1939;  Morey, 
Romeijn, & Rouder, in press; Verhagen, & Wagenmakers, 2014). In the present article, 
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we apply Bayes factors to these non-significant results in order to decide: Does the form 
of hypnotic induction really not matter, does it matter, or should we suspend judgment 
given the current state of the evidence? 
In order to know how strong the evidence is for the H1 that an induction is 
especially effective, versus H0, the predictions of H1 need to be specified (i.e. the 
approximate expected effect size is needed; Dienes, 2015). Evidence is always relative, 
depending on how well one model (e.g. an H1) better predicts the data compared with 
another model (e.g. H0). For example, data may not discriminate very well between H0 
and an H1 that only predicted small effect sizes, yet strongly favor H0 over an H1 that 
allowed large effect sizes. Thus, Bayes factors are, and should be, sensitive to how H1 
is modeled (Lindley, 1993). 
The claim that different inductions are differentially effective comes essentially 
from clinicians (Bányai & Hilgard, 1976; Lynn et al., 1987; Malott, 1984; Matthews et 
al., 1985; Miller et al., 1991; Van Der Does et al., 1989). Therefore, their judgments 
about what size of difference could be expected constitute a key relevant consideration 
in assessing the effectiveness of different inductions. We therefore designed a 
questionnaire aimed at professional hypnotherapists in which we asked them –based on 
their intuitions and experience– to predict what size of difference could be expected 
between the standard induction and the other forms of induction described above: 
indirect, idiosyncratic, double, and active-alert inductions. We used the estimations of 
professionals to compute Bayes factors. However, we also  based the  Bayes  factors on 
empirical results that investigated the effect of induction versus no-induction on 
hypnotic responsiveness as an estimate of the order of size effect that could be expected 
between different inductions, independent of clinical judgment. In a recent review, 
Terhune and Cardeña (2016) refer to Braffman and Kirsch (1999) and Hilgard and Tart, 
(1966) for the effect of an induction versus no-induction on measurements of 
suggestibility; in addition we used Bányai & Hilgard, (1976) and Weitzenhoffer and 
Sjoberg (1961) studies. 
In  sum,  we  will  use  Bayes  factors  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  different 
 
inductions compared to the standard induction: Specifically, we will investigate the key 
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evidence for the active-alert induction, double induction, the indirect induction and the 
idiosyncratic (or individualized) induction. The evidence for each against the standard 
induction depends on how more effective these inductions could be relative to the 
standard induction. We will be clear how we formulate predictions, and the different 
bases for formulating predictions. 
. 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Analyses 
 
Bayes Factors. Bayes factors (B) indicate the relative strength of evidence for two 
hypotheses (H0 and H1, Dienes, 2014) and are based on the principle that evidence 
supports the hypothesis that most strongly predicted it. Specifically, B is how much more 
probable the pattern of data are with respect to H1 rather than H0, so a BF of 3, for 
instance, means that the data are 3 times more probable assuming H1 rather than H0. 
Consequently, we need to determine what the hypothesis predicts. Here H0 is the 
prediction of a single population value, no difference between conditions. The 
predictions for H1 can be based, inter alia, on results from previous studies, on other 
conditions included in the current experiment, or on expert judgments (see Dienes, 2014, 
2015, for different examples). B varies between 0 and ∞. A B of “1” indicates that the 
data do not favor one theory over the other, whereas values greater than 1 indicate 
increasing evidence for the alternative over the null hypothesis, and values less than 1 
indicate increasing evidence for the null over the alternative hypothesis. But we need to 
know how far from 1 and how close to 0 the BF has to be in order to draw specific 
conclusions. Using conventional criteria (Jeffreys, 1939; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013), 
1/3 ≤ B ≤ 3 means that data are insensitive in distinguishing the hypotheses, B > 3 
indicates “substantial” (Jeffreys, 1939; “moderate”, Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013) 
evidence for H1 over H0, and B < 1/3 indicates substantial (or moderate) evidence for 
H0 over H1 (for an online Bayes factor calculator: 
http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm). 
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These criteria are not arbitrary; 3 corresponds to the level of evidence we have been 
using for a century as a community, in that if the effect size is about that expected in the 
model of H1, a p of about .05 corresponds to a B of about 3 (though there is no monotonic 
relation between p’s and B’s; e.g. Lindley, 1957, Dienes 2014). 
We modelled the different alternative hypotheses (H1s) on two main sources: 
First, we asked to a panel of professional hypnotherapists, by means of a questionnaire 
(see the following section), to predict what size of difference could be expected between 
the standard induction and the other forms of induction described in the introduction. 
Second, we used the empirical effect of a standard induction versus no-induction/no 
instruction at all (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Bányai & Hilgard, 1976; Hilgard & Tart, 
1966; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961). We reasoned that the difference between the 
standard induction and the other forms of procedure could be expected to be of the 
magnitude of the difference of size between standard versus no- induction. If an 
induction changes suggestibility by x, then a very poor induction, amounting to no 
induction, would of course differ from the standard induction by that amount x. Using 
symmetry, a simple prediction is that a better induction may differ from the standard by 
roughly the same scale of effect, x, in the opposite direction. Note these expectations are 
explicitly modeled as imprecise; the scale of the effect is just that, a rough scale. Note 
also that to get the Bayes factors to give meaningful answers we just need a rough scale, 
not an exact effect size.    The standard induction increasing performance by 5% versus 
25% would affect how effective we think inductions in general could be and hence by 
how much they might differ between themselves (in the same way as baby shoe sizes 
differ less between themselves than adult shoe sizes). 
In combining the four empirical studies (by a fixed effects meta-analysis, studies 
inversely weighted by squared standard error (i.e., by Bayesian updating based on 
assuming the uncertainty in each mean was normally distributed), we found that the 
standard induction increased performance by 1.46 suggestions out of 10 (SE = 0.20). (For 
simplicity, we averaged over whether a no induction came before an induction or vice 
versa, where order was counterbalanced.) 
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Participants 
 
To obtain participants, we implemented the questionnaire by means of Google 
Form and Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) (the questionnaire is available as 
Supplementary Material). The questionnaire was distributed by means of the mailing list 
Hypnosis   Listserv   of   the   International Society of Hypnosis 
(http://www.ishhypnosis.org/membership/hypnosis- 
listserv/), which only accepts clinicians who are credentialed, and to different UK professionals 
 
by using directories found on Google by entering the keyword professional 
hypnotherapists United Kingdom. We also sent the questionnaire to the members of the 
Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis (SCEH), which requires the highest 
degree in one's field (PhD/PsyD or MA/RN for nurses). We thus have two samples of 
subjects, as described below. 
The questionnaire asked professionals to predict what difference in hypnotizability 
scores (such as they are calculated in classical standardized hypnotizability scales) they 
would expect between the standard induction and the other forms of hypnotic induction 
described in the introduction. More specifically, we instructed participants to imagine 
that we tested the hypnotizability score of a group of 100 individuals (undergraduates 
who volunteer to take part in hypnosis research) –using the standard induction– and that 
we obtained a group average hypnotizability score of 5 (out of 10). Then professionals 
were asked to predict the effect of using the other induction procedures, rather than the 
standard induction, on that average score of 5. They should indicate, according to their 
intuition or experience, 1) the most likely average new score (the average of all subjects) 
the new induction (e.g., indirect induction) would produce; 2) the maximum score for 
the average of all subjects that is just plausible for the new induction; and 3) the 
minimum score for the average of all subjects that is just plausible for the new induction. 
As an illustration, in the case of the standard versus indirect induction, professionals had 
the following statement: 
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An indirect induction here is defined as an induction that uses relaxation 
suggestions but that is worded in an indirect and permissive way rather than in 
a direct and non-permissive way. Indicate, according to your intuition or 
experience, the minimum plausible average, the most likely average, and the 
maximum plausible average hypnotizability score, respectively, that using an 
indirect induction would produce, given that an average score of 5 is obtained 
with a standard direct relaxation induction. Note that each value should be larger 
than the preceding one (see Supplementary Material). 
 
 
Five participants filled out the questionnaire from the first sample (four of them came 
from the list Hypnosis lListserv) and 28 from the second sample. One participant was 
removed from the first sample as he/she had missing data. Ten participants from the 
second sample filled out the questionnaire completely and no participants from the 
remainder replied to either one of the test questions. We thus have 10 participants from 
the second sample for subsequent analyses. We do not have demographic data for the 
first sample, but we do have such data for the second sample (see Table_1). As can be 
seen from Figure 1, clinicians are not of one mind; there is a range of beliefs among 
hypnotherapists. Inspecting the graphs, clinicians almost span the full range from 0 to 
10 (given that, we tested another model, a uniform from 0 to 10, see supplementary 
materials). For simplicity, we merged the two samples for analysis (see Figure 2) (in 
supplementary material we give Bayes factors for the two samples separately). We fitted 
a normal distribution by taking the mean most plausible average as the mean of the 
normal, and the minimum and maximum average as being two standard deviations from 
the mean. We asked people to respond only if they were not aware of the laboratory work 
on the effectiveness of different inductions. If clinicians based their intuitions on the 
very studies we are testing, the test would be circular and invalid. We cannot guarantee 
that the intuitions of the responding clinicians were not, albeit indirectly, informed by 
the papers we analyze below. The analyses based on the empirically determined 
difference between induction and no induction does not have this weakness. 
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 SCEH (N = 10) 
University Degree N (out of 10) 
Ph.D/Dr./Psy.D 5 
Prof. 1 
M.A (Master of Art) 0 
M.A/RN (for nurses) 1 
Other 3: 1 MSW, 1 M.D Development- Behavioural 
Paediatrician, 1 LCSW-ACP, BCD 
Profession N (out of 10) 
Clinician 4 
Researcher 1 
Both 5 
Hypnotherapy years of 
experience (for 
clinicians, N= 9) 
Mean = 22.10 
SD = 13.95 
Academic and/or 
clinical publications 
and/or presentations 
on hypnosis? 
N (out of 10) 
Yes 8 
No 2 
 
 
Table 1. Demographic data of participants. 
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Fig 1. Differences between the first and second sample of participants. The figure shows 
the differences between the first and second sample of participants in their evaluations 
of the different types of inductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. H1s (priors) based on experts’ subjective judgments for the different types of induction. 
EV stands for Expected Value (the most likely average difference the new induction would 
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produce); SD stands for Standard Deviation. 
 
 
 
Results 
 
Indirect. Lynn et al., (1987) found a difference on hypnotizability scores of 0.01 (SE = 
0.3) between the indirect and standard procedure, out of 12 suggestions (for comparison 
with predictions, the difference was rescaled to be out of 10 . Accordingly, here and 
below the values reported are the rescaled values and original values can be found in 
supplementary material. . On average professionals estimated a likely difference of 0.73 
between indirect and standard (i.e., the indirect induction is considered to be more 
effective by professionals than the standard induction) with a minimum of -0.68 and a 
max of 2.37. On average the tail is 1.53 in either direction. So we modelled H1 as a 
normal distribution with a mean of 0.73 and an SD of 0.77 (see Figure 2). We obtained 
BN(0.73, 0.77) = 0.251, that is evidence for no effect relative to the effect expected by the 
professionals. 
We also computed a B-value with the alternative hypothesis based on the estimated 
difference between induction and no induction in past key studies, as detailed above. We 
modelled H1 with a half-normal distribution with a mean of 0 and the SD set to the scale 
of effect expected, i.e. 1.46. We obtained a BH(0, 1.46) = 0.202.2 That is, there is substantial 
evidence for the null hypothesis relative to the size of the effect that could be expected 
based on the general effectiveness of inductions. We can explore the robustness of this 
conclusion by means of a Robustness Region.3 That is, the range of scale factors 
 
 
1 For notating how H1 was modelled in calculating B, the “N” indicates a Normal distribution 
was used; the first number in parentheses is the mean and the second the standard deviation (see 
Dienes 2014, 2015 for this convention). Here we used a normal distribution because it is one of 
the simplest distributions that could be fit to a given mean about equidistant from a rough 
minimum and maximum. 
 
2 For notating how H1 was modelled in calculating B, the “H” indicates a Half-Normal 
distribution was used; the first number in parentheses is always 0 in this case, indicating the mode 
of the half-normal; and the second is the standard deviation (see Dienes 2014, 2015, for this 
convention). Here we used a half- normal distribution as the alternative hypothesis is that the 
effect of the studied induction on suggestibility scores in comparison with the traditional 
induction should be positive and expected to be of the magnitude of the size of the effect between 
induction and no-induction (as argued for by Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018). 
 
3 Thanks to Balazs Aczel for this suggestion. 
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(standard deviations of the half-normal) that yield the same conclusion (in this case 
evidence for H0 relative to H1 with B < 1/3): RR[min, max] where min is the minimum 
SD that still yields B < 1/3 and max the maximum: RR[0.9, ∞]. Accordingly, the 
conclusion holds even if one thought the right scale of effect was as low as 0.9 units. 
 
 
Idiosyncratic. Van Der Does et al. (1989) found a difference of 0.30 (SE = 0.30) 
between the idiosyncratic and standard procedure out of 5 suggestion (for comparison 
with predictions, the difference was rescaled to be out of 10). On average, professionals 
estimated a likely difference of 1.13 between idiosyncratic and standard (i.e., the 
idiosyncratic induction is considered to be more effective by professionals than the 
standard induction) with a minimum of -0.06 and a max of 2.26. On average the tail is 
1.16 in either direction. So we modelled H1 with a normal distribution with a mean of 
 
1.13 and an SD of 0.58 (see Figure 2). We obtained BN(1.13, 0.58) = 0.34; that is evidence 
rather in the direction of no effect relative to the effect expected by the professionals. 
As previously, we computed a B-value with the alternative hypothesis based on 
the difference on hypnotizability scores between standard induction and no-induction. 
We modelled H1 with a half-normal distribution with a mean of 0 and an SD of 1.46, 
giving a BH(0, 1.46) = 0.54, that is no substantial evidence in favor of either H0 or H1, RR [0, 
2.5], a conclusion robust over reasonable scale factors. 
Double induction. Matthews et al., (1985) found a difference of 0.29 (SE = 0.20) 
between the standard procedure and double procedure out of 12 suggestions (here the 
standard procedure gave rise to numerically higher hypnotizability scores than the 
double procedure). For comparison with predictions, the difference was rescaled to be 
out of 10. On average, professionals estimated a likely difference of -0.16 between 
double and standard (i.e., the double induction is considered to be less effective by 
professionals than the standard induction) with a minimum of -0.99 and a max of 1.27. 
On average the tail is 1.13 in either direction. So we modelled H1 as a normal 
distribution with a mean of -0.16 and an SD of 0.57 (see Figure 2). The sign of the mean 
was entered as positive, (i.e., 0.16) because in the study of Matthews et al., (1985), 
similarly to the expectations of professionals, the standard procedure gave rise to higher 
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hypnotizability scores than the double procedure. We obtained a BN(0.16, 0.57) = 0.93; so 
the evidence is insensitive for discriminating whether the double induction is any 
different in effectiveness than the standard induction. This conclusion is based on a 
model of H1 elicited from professionals as a group who do not believe that the double 
induction would be more effective than the standard induction; if we just consider the 
H1 derived from the first sample of professionals who believed that the double induction 
would be more effective, then the Bayes factor provides substantial evidence for no 
difference (see supplementary materials). 
 
 
As in the two previous cases we computed a B-value with an alternative hypothesis based 
difference on hypnotizability scores between standard induction and no-induction, in this 
case considering the H1 that the double induction would be more effective than the 
standard induction, BH(0, 1.46) = 0.06; substantial evidence for that the double induction 
procedure is no more effective than the standard induction, assuming the effect is of the 
same order as the difference between induction and no induction; RR[ 0.23, ∞], robust 
over any plausible value of the scale factor. 
 
 
 
Active-alert. Bányai and Hilgard (1976) found a difference in hypnotizability scores of 
 
0.27 (SE = 0.25) between the standard procedure and the active-alert procedure out of 8 
suggestions (here the standard procedure gave rise to numerically higher hypnotizability 
scores than the active alert). For comparison with predictions, the difference was 
rescaled to be out of 10. On average professionals estimated a difference of -0.21 
between active-alert and standard (i.e., the standard induction is considered to be more 
effective by professionals than the active-alert induction) with a minimum of -1.26 and 
a max of 1.18. On average the tail is 1.22 in either direction. So we modelled H1 with a 
normal distribution with a mean of 0.21 and an SD of 0.61 (changing the sign of the 
mean (-0.21) so that positive is in the theoretically expected direction) (see Figure 2). We 
obtained a BN(0.21, 0.61) = 0.68; that is, the evidence is insensitive for discriminating 
whether the active induction is any more effective than the standard induction. We also 
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computed a B-value with an alternative hypothesis based difference on hypnotizability 
scores between standard induction and no induction, BH(0, 1.46) = 0.51, that is no 
substantial evidence for H0 or H1, RR[0, 2.3]. 
Malott (1984) found a difference of 0.05 (SE = 0.84) between standard and 
active-alert out of 8 suggestions (here the standard procedure gave rise to numerically 
higher hypnotizability scores than the active alert). For comparison with predictions, the 
difference was rescaled to be out of 10. Using    the same normal distribution as above 
to model H1, BN(0.21, 0.61) = 0.80; no substantial evidence for no effect relative to the 
effects that the professionals expected. Using the alternative hypothesis based difference 
on hypnotizability scores between a standard induction and no-induction, BH(0, 1.46) = 
0.52, no substantial evidence for H0 or H1, RR[0, 2.5]. 
 
Discussion 
 
The present statistical revaluation of the effectiveness of different forms of induction on 
hypnotic responsiveness indicates that more research should be done in order to 
determine the influence of different forms of induction procedure on hypnotic 
responsiveness (Terhune & Cardeña, 2016). Bayes factors mostly indicated no 
substantial evidence for H0 or H1, no matter whether the alternative hypotheses (H1s) 
were based on expert judgments or an empirically informed alternative hypothesis (using 
the effect of induction versus no-induction on hypnotic responsiveness as an estimate). 
This is true for the active-alert and idiosyncratic induction. The exceptions concern the 
indirect versus direct induction for which the Bayes factors indicate evidence that the 
former is no more effective than the latter; for the double induction, where there is 
evidence against the double induction being better than the standard (a hypothesis that 
the clinicians as a group did not share). 
To summarize our strategy in modeling H1, the model (often called a prior) 
needs to reflect what knowledge we have and otherwise represent the remaining 
uncertainty; so long as the model does that, it allows for a computation of the evidence 
for H1 vs H0 given existing knowledge. As the change in suggestibility given a standard 
induction is reasonably small, our  model  based on that change predicts the  difference 
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between different inductions is reasonably small; and thus, the analyses mostly led to 
the conclusion that we have insufficient evidence to date for drawing any conclusion for 
several of the inductions. Now compare that to using a uniform over the full range as a 
model; that indicates we already have evidence for the equivalence of different 
inductions. We think the former conclusion is more reasonable, because it is 
scientifically informed. In other words, we should take into account the effectiveness of 
a standard induction, because in the absence of other relevant knowledge, it sets a 
reasonable scale of effect. 
Our conclusions concerning there being insufficient evidence for differential 
effectiveness of inductions are restricted to the inductions examined in the present paper 
and to behavioral scores, as subjective scores have not been studied. Our findings do not 
necessarily generalize to other types of inductions; however, we have included the main 
inductions considered in the literature. Also, our conclusions are restricted to 
comparisons of specific inductions and do not speak to the impact of inductions more 
broadly (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). Here we restricted our analysis to types of induction 
that we deemed particularly relevant to clinicians or that were developed by clinicians 
(Bányai & Hilgard, 1976; Lynn et al., 1987;Matthews et al., 1985; Van Der Does et al., 
1989) and that we therefore expected clinicians would possess intuitions regarding their 
relative effectiveness. In addition, we restricted our analyses to studies that used 
suggestibility scores as dependent variables. Therefore, we excluded studies that 
compared the effectiveness of one of the different induction procedures we evaluated 
(indirect, double, idiosyncratic, active-alert) that used a standard induction but used a 
different dependent variable to assess hypnotic responsiveness. For example, Miller et 
al., (1991) found that suggestions for analgesia were not significantly different after 
following an active-alert versus following a standard induction. 
Other types of inductions than the ones studied in our research have been tested. 
For example, Glass and Barber (1961) substituted the standard induction with the 
administration of a placebo described to subjects as a powerful hypnotic drug.44 They 
 
4 Descriptives not given, so a Bayes factor could not be calculated. 
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found that the pill was non-significantly different from a classical induction in increasing 
suggestibility (see also, Baker & Kirsch, 1993 who used the placebo induction procedure 
in the context of analgesia). Council, Kirsch, Vickery, and Carlson (1983) compared the 
effectiveness of a cognitive-behavioural skill induction to a standard induction 
procedure. The former instructs subjects that suggestions are goal-directed imaginings 
and experimenters “[describe] cognitive strategies that the subject could use to 
experience hypnotic suggestions” (p. 434). The researchers found that the skill-based  
induction increased suggestibility scores to a similar level as the standard induction 
compared with a no induction baseline condition.55 
Malott (1984) provided one finding that goes against the pattern of non- 
significant results across inductions. He found that while the active-alert and traditional 
inductions did not differ significantly, each was superior to an alert induction that did 
not use pedaling.66 Thus, he postulated a U-shape relation between arousal and the 
effectiveness of a hypnotic induction. An important methodological point for future 
studies is to determine the changes an induction causes to expectations, motivations, and 
beliefs about hypnosis or hypnotic responding (Braffman & Kirsch, 1994). In this case, 
procedures that have greatest effects on participants (e.g. making them extra relaxed or 
extra alert) may change expectations about being in a special state to the greatest extent, 
and hence function as especially good inductions. This hypothesis, however, remains a 
conjecture. 
The conclusions about the judgments of clinicians are relative to the clinicians we 
obtained responses from. Our sample was small, and clinicians with different views of 
hypnosis are likely to make different judgements. We do not have sufficient data to test 
predictors of these speculations. Fortunately, there is converging evidence from our 
analyses of empirically derived effect sizes for potential differences between the 
standard induction and no induction. We can take into account the large variability 
 
5 Using the alternative hypothesis based difference on hypnotisability scores between a standard 
induction and no-induction, BH(0, 1.46) = 0.16, that is substantial evidence in favour of H0; standard 
versus skill procedures are not differentially effective. 
 
6 Bs here confirms H1s: Active-alert versus alert (Bn(0.21, 0.61) = 9.7; BH(0, 1.46) = 51); Standard 
versus alert (BH(0, 1.46) = 60.8). 
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among clinicians in their judgments of the differential effectiveness of different 
inductions by allowing large differences among inductions. The evidence indicates if we 
expect that inductions differ greatly in their impact on hypnotizability,  the evidence is 
against them being differentially effective. On the other hand, if we base our judgments 
on the small difference that arises between the standard induction and no induction, then 
the current evidence leaves open the possibility that different inductions may produce 
small differences amongst themselves in hypnotizability, on a similar scale as the 
difference between induction and no induction.      
  Clinical implications follow from our findings (for a similar view see Lynn, 
Green, Polizzi, Gautum, et al, in press). “Clinicians need not be unduly concerned” ( 
Lynn et al, p xx) about the exact nature of the induction; but working with clients in 
ways that suit their preferences may well enhance the experience of hypnosis, even if it 
produces only a minimal difference in hypnotic responsiveness.   
Theoretically, the evidence against large effects places pressure on theories that 
regard hypnotic response as caused by a special altered state of consciousness. It seems 
gratuitous to introduce an as yet undefined altered state to explain a small difference that 
might be explained by expectations or motivations enhancing the (as yet unknown) 
processes that can produce a response without an altered state (see also Lynn et al). 
In sum, the lack of substantial evidence pro or contra the differential effectiveness 
of different forms of induction procedure invites additional research (Terhune & 
Cardeña, 2016), and we provide a methodology for determining when the evidence 
accumulated is good enough for determining differences between inductions. 
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 SCEH (N = 10) 
University Degree N (out of 10) 
Ph.D/Dr./Psy.D 5 
Prof. 1 
M.A (Master of Art) 0 
M.A/RN (for nurses) 1 
Other 3: 1 MSW, 1 M.D Development-Behavioural 
Paediatrician, 1 LCSW-ACP, BCD 
Profession N (out of 10) 
Clinician 4 
Researcher 1 
Both 5 
Hypnotherapy years of 
experience (for clinicians, 
N = 9) 
Mean = 22.10 
SD = 13.95 
Academic and/or clinical 
publications 
and/presentations on 
hypnosis? 
N (out of 10) 
Yes 8 
No 2 
 
